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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of inter vivos (lifetime) transfers of ownership in
German family firms between 2000 and 2013. Survey evidence indicates that owners
of firms with strong current business conditions transfer ownership at higher rates
than others. When a firm’s self-described business condition improves from “normal”
to “good,” the relative likelihood of an inter vivos transfer increases by 46 percent.
Inter vivos transfer rates also rose following a 2009 reform that reduced transfer taxes.
These patterns suggest that transfer taxes significantly influence rates and timing of
inter vivos ownership transfers.
Keywords Inter vivos transfers · Transfer taxes · Family firms
JEL Classification H24 · D31 · D22
1 Introduction
Successful family firms are commonly transferred from one generation to the next.1
Succession occurs naturally at an owner’s death, but may also be planned in advance
with inter vivos (during life) transfers. Business conditions, family considerations,
1 The majority of firms around the world are family firms (La Porta et al. 1999; Faccio and Lang 2002).
See Burkart et al. (2003) on basic theoretical considerations regarding succession in family firms.
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and estate, gift, and inheritance taxes all have the potential to influence the timing and
extent of inter vivos transfers. And these transfers, in changing ownership, may affect
the operations and productivities of family firms.
This paper considers the determinants of inter vivos transfers of assets in Ger-
man family firms. The analysis is based on unique survey data covering the years
2000–2013. The evidence indicates that inter vivos ownership transfers are most com-
mon in firms with strong business conditions. Furthermore, inter vivos transfers rose
following a German tax reform in 2009 that reduced transfer taxes.2
The difficulty of obtaining data has limited the number of empirical studies of inter
vivos transfers of family firms. Scholars find that macroeconomic conditions—espe-
cially financial factors such as the inability to find financial resources to liquidate the
possible exit of heirs, the market environment, or increased competition—appear to
influence succession plans of family firms (De Massis et al. 2008; Vozikis et al. 2012).
While firms are typically the focus of the theory and empirical interest, the units of
observation in most data sets are households rather than firms. Empirical studies indi-
cate that transfer taxes influence behavior3 and that the amount of inter vivos transfers
depends on the incomes of parents and children (Bernheim et al. 2004; Joulfaian 2004,
2005; Hrung 2004; Villanueva 2005; McGarry 1999; Arrondel and Laferrère 2001;
Stark and Zhang 2002). Taxpayers forego substantial savings by not making inter vivos
transfers that fully exploit annual gift tax exemptions (Poterba 2001; McGarry 2001,
2013; Joulfaian and McGarry 2004). Another strand of related literature considers
bequest motives (Kotlikoff 1988; Modigliani 1988; Gale and Scholz 1994; Laitner
and Ohlsson 2001; Arrondel and Masson 2006; Kopczuk 2007; Ameriks et al. 2011).
Wealth transfers from one generation to the next may be accidental or intentional, with
inter vivos transferring relatively clear cases of intentional choices.
Firm owners have better information on the business conditions of their firms than
do outsiders such as external investors, banks or tax authorities. These information
asymmetries can influence a firm’s financing and investment decision (Leland and Pyle
1977; Myers and Majluf 1984; Miller and Rock 1985). In a similar vein, decisions
on ownership structure may depend on the firm’s business condition as perceived by
the firm owner. A firm’s self-assessed current business condition is likely to offer
information on firm value that is not contained in balance sheet variables. Balance
sheets are backward looking, whereas the assessment of a firm’s business condition
by its owner reflects soft information and expectations about future developments.
As a result, it is valuable to consider the relationship between a firm’s self-assessed
business condition and any transfers of firm ownership to the next generation.
The paper’s analysis of inter vivos transfers of assets in family firms is based on data
that include evidence from a survey conducted among German family firms on inheri-
tances, inter vivos transfers and taxation. The data include Germany’s most important
business cycle and firm survey information that serve as the foundation of the Ifo
2 See Schinke (2016) on how the tax reform influenced inter vivos transfers to different types of recipients
including the core family, other close relatives, and unrelated recipients.
3 On inheritance and inter vivos transfer taxation and legislation see, e.g., Gale et al. (2001), Ellul et al.
(2010), Hines (2010, 2013), Kopczuk (2009, 2013a, b) and Wrede (2014). Transfer taxes may give rise
to declines in investment, slow sales growth, and a depletion of cash reserves around family successions
(Tsoutsoura 2015).
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Business Climate Index, Germany’s leading business cycle indicator. The new survey
data include information on the years when firms made inter vivos ownership trans-
fers. These data are matched with Ifo business survey data, which include information
on how firm owners assess the current economic situation, business expectations,
whether firm activity is constrained, and many other firm-specific characteristics. The
data incorporate balance sheet information from external sources (Amadeus Bureau
van Dijk and Hoppenstedt Firmeninformationen GmbH) and cover the years 2000 to
2013. Business survey and balance sheet data are preprocessed and provided by the
Economics and Business Data Center, Munich.
German tax authorities generally base their assessments of the values of transferred
firms on average revenues over three business years prior to transfer.4 Consequently,
new information for the current business year, which is available only to firm owners,
reveals likely future changes in taxable values and thereby affects incentives to make
current inter vivos transfers.
The results indicate that when a firm’s self-described business condition improves,
for example, from “normal” to “good,” then the relative likelihood of an inter vivos
transfer rises by 46 percent. The reason for this timing may be that owners of firms with
strong business conditions anticipate higher tax valuations in the future and therefore
accelerate ownership transfers as part of prudent tax planning.
2 Inter vivos transfers and family firms
Despite the importance of estate planning and the availability of simple methods of tax
avoidance, the evidence suggests that wealthy people make surprisingly few inter vivos
transfers, thereby foregoing substantial potential tax savings (McGarry 2001, 2013).
Empirical studies describe many factors that influence inter vivos transfers. Inheritance
and gift taxes affect the timing of transfers, typically encouraging inter vivos transfers
compared to bequests (Bernheim et al. 2004; Joulfaian 2004). Capital gain taxes can be
offsetting considerations, since the favorable tax treatment of appreciated assets held
until death can create some situations in which taxpayers benefit from avoiding inter
vivos transfers (Poterba 2001; Joulfaian 2005). The composition of household wealth
also influences the chance of making inter vivos transfers. When wealth is held in
illiquid forms, such as private business, households are less likely to make inter vivos
transfers than when wealth was held in more liquid forms (Poterba 2001). The amount
of inter vivos transfers also increases with the lifetime income of parents (Poterba 2001;
Hrung 2004): An additional dollar of parental lifetime income appears to increase
inter vivos transfers by 0.7 cents in Germany and by 1.2 cents in the United States
(Villanueva 2005). Another issue is the allocation of inter vivos gifts among heirs.5
Empirical studies indicate that parents make greater inter vivos transfers to children
with lower incomes than to other children (McGarry 1999, 2016). Private transfers
are targeted toward recipients that are liquidity constrained (Guiso and Jappelli 1991).
4 See § 201 subsection two of the valuation law (Bewertungsgesetz).
5 On theoretical models of intergenerational private exchanges within the family under alternative assump-
tions as to the nature of relations between parents and children, see Cremer et al. (1992).
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The appeal of this type of redistribution is very intuitive, though as a theoretical matter
there are models with the opposite prediction that parents would make greater inter
vivos transfers to children with higher incomes than to children with lower incomes
(Stark and Zhang 2002).
Family firms may be special cases due to tacit knowledge on the part of the founder
or successor (Cabrera-Suárez et al. 2001; Kanniainen and Poutvaara 2007). Family
firms display a great deal of stakeholder focus and feel more accountable to employees
and banks than to shareholders (Mullins and Schoar 2016). Studies often find that
family firms outperform other firms (McConaughy et al. 1998; Anderson and Reeb
2003).6 Following ownership succession, firms whose incoming CEOs are related to
the departed CEO or firm founder tend to underperform relative to firms with new CEOs
who are not related to firm insiders (Pérez-González 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2007;
Grossmann and Strulik 2010; Molly et al. 2010; Wennberg et al. 2011). Family firms
have also been found to be less tax aggressive than non-family firms (Chen et al. 2010).
Owners of family firms may make provisions for succession during their lifetimes.
In some situations, there are incentives to purchase life insurance that will provide
liquidity when estate taxes are due (Holtz-Eakin et al. 2001).7 Several studies exam-
ine the succession planning of family businesses (e.g., Sharma et al. 1997, 2003).8
Sharma et al. (2003) find that even in cases where owners of family firms wanted
to preserve their firms, the need to find successors did not induce succession plan-
ning. Succession planning appears to start only when trusted successors are available.
Caillaud and Cohen (2000) interpret intergenerational transfers in a theoretical model
as a cooperative agreement across generations sharing common principles, and Stark
and Nicinska (2015) offer evidence that those who receive bequests are more likely
than others to want to make their own bequests. Vozikis et al. (2012) predict that
financial factors such as limited internal financial resources (high opportunity costs
of obtaining external financing, inability to sustain transfer tax burdens, low capital
stocks, and high earnings variability) impede succession planning. De Massis et al.
(2008) describe potential obstacles to a smooth succession. These obstacles include
private family conflicts (e.g., low ability or motivation of potential successors, family
rivalries, and absence of mutual trust), financial issues (e.g., tax burdens or financial
resources that are inadequate to liquidate possible exit of heirs) or changes in the
economic environment of the firm (decline in business performance, loss of key cus-
tomers, decreasing business scale). The willingness of offspring to join family firms
correlates positively with business size (Stavrou 1999).
There are substantial transaction costs associated with transferring ownership of a
family firm (Bjuggren and Sund 2005). Rates of ownership transfers are likely to be
sensitive to changes in estate, gift and inheritance taxes, such as the 2004 abolition
6 On how family ownership, control, organization, and management influence firm value and firm perfor-
mance see Jacquemin and de Ghellinck (1980), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Bertrand et al. (2008) and
Minetti et al. (2015).
7 In the absence of sufficient life insurance coverage, liquidity problems driven by estate tax liabilities may
force heirs of family firms to sell business assets (Astrachan and Tutterow 1996; Brunetti 2006; Houben
and Maiterth 2011).
8 On exit strategies in family firms see also DeTienne and Chirico (2013) and Wennberg and DeTienne
(2014).
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of transfer taxes in Sweden. Bjuggren and Sund (2001) describe the role of the legal
system in facilitating smooth transition of family firms from one generation to the next.
3 German inheritance and gift taxes
Germany does not tax estates, but it does tax receipt of inheritances and inter vivos
gifts. Tax rates rise with the amount of gift or inheritance received, and rates are
conditioned on the closeness of any family connection between those who give and
those who receive. The lowest tax rates and highest exempt amounts apply to gifts to
spouses, followed successively by children, grandchildren, other close relatives, and
finally by all others. The German government grants special tax relief for transfers of
family business assets, this favorable tax treatment intended to preserve jobs in family
businesses. For this purpose, business assets include agricultural and forestry assets
and privately held shares in corporations when the owner holds more than 25% of the
shares. Inter vivos transfers are subject to the same tax rules as inheritances.
Until 2008, business assets were assessed at tax values that were typically con-
siderably lower than market values, the outcome of tax practices rather than explicit
exemptions for family firms (Houben and Maiterth 2011). In addition, there was a
statutory tax exemption of e225,000 for transfers of business assets in family firms,
and the remaining taxable amount was reduced by 35%.
Since 2009, business assets have been assessed at estimated market values. Firms
with fewer than 20 employees can be transferred tax free. Owners of larger firms can
choose between two types of tax relief, of which the first reduces the taxable amount
of business assets by 85%. To be eligible for this relief, no more than 50 percent of
business assets may consist of non-operating assets such as leased real estate, securities
or cultural property; firm owners must commit to keeping the firm in business for at
least 5 years; and the sum of wages and salaries over the following 5 years must be at
least 400 percent of an historical average. An additional tax allowance of e150,000
may apply to the remaining 15 percent of business assets if this value is small. The
second option is even more generous, exempting 100 percent of business assets, but
can be chosen only if non-operating assets constitute no more than 10 percent of total
business assets; the firm stays in business for at least 7 years; and the sum of wages
and salaries over the following 7 years is at least 700 percent of an historical average.
These employment-related tax exemptions apply immediately, with taxpayers required
to remit transfer taxes if and when future employment levels subsequently fail to meet
these targets. Eligibility for these tax exemptions is the same whether transfers are
made within or outside the family.
Transfers of any business assets that remain after tax relief and exemptions, together
with other assets such as real estate and financial assets, are subject to gift and inher-
itance taxation. Personal tax exemptions apply, e.g., e400,000 for a transfer from
parent to child (e205,000 until 2008). Tax exemptions can be used every 10 years,
making inter vivos transfers an effective instrument for reducing taxes. Tax rates are
progressive and vary between 7 and 50%, depending on the degree of kinship between
transferor and beneficiary, and the type of property transferred. Transfers to close rel-
atives such as children are subject to lower rates of tax than transfers to more distant
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relatives such as cousins, which in turn are subject to lower rates of tax than transfers
to unrelated individuals; furthermore, transfers of business assets are taxed at the low
rates applicable to transfers to children, regardless of the beneficiary.
For example, consider a firm worth e15 million with over 20 employees that the
owner transfers inter vivos to a child in 2010. Using the 85% tax relief option, business
assets of onlye2.25 million are subject to taxation at the time of the transfer. Deducting
the personal tax exemption of e400,000, the taxable transfer is e1.85 million. At a
tax rate of 19%, the gift tax due is e351,500.
4 Analytical framework
It is useful to consider the effects of transfer taxes on incentives to transfer ownership
of family firms. This section analyzes aspects of these incentives created by changing
economic and legal environments.
4.1 Timing of ownership transfers
Let qt denote a family firm’s true value at time t, and st denote the signal of firm value
observed by the tax authority and other outsiders. The original owner’s (flow) after-tax
return at time t of maintaining ownership is given by v(qt ), whereas the after-tax return
is w(qt ) if successors own the firm. These returns can differ if ownership affects firm
performance or if the same return is taxed at different rates if received by different
potential owners. In the absence of transfer tax considerations, families would choose
to transfer ownership in period t only if w(qt ) > v(qt ). Transfer taxes complicate
this decision.
A family chooses inter vivos transfers to maximize the present value Ψ , given by:
ψ  t
∗
∫
0
e−r tv(qt )dt +
∞∫
t∗
e−r tw(qt )dt − e−r t∗τ
(
st∗ , t
∗), (1)
in which r is the decision maker’s discount rate, t* is the date of ownership transfer,
and τ(st∗ , t∗) is the transfer tax imposed in period t∗ on a transfer of a family firm
with observable value st∗ . Time is an argument of the transfer tax function because
tax laws vary over time, so the tax obligation associated with a transfer of a firm with
a given observable value is time dependent.
Differentiating Ψ with respect to t* produces:
ert
∗ dψ
dt∗
 v(qt∗) − w(qt∗) + rτ
(
st∗ , t
∗) − ∂τ(st∗ , t
∗)
∂s∗t
dst∗
dt∗
− ∂τ(st∗ , t
∗)
∂t∗
. (2)
The right side of Eq. (2) is the (undiscounted) value of slightly delaying ownership
transfer at time t*, so an optimizing decision maker solving for an interior solution
with continuous variables transfers the firm at time t* only if this expression equals
zero. The first two terms on the right side of Eq. (2) are familiar from the transfer
decision in the absence of taxation, and have the intuitive property that delaying trans-
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fer is more attractive the greater is the difference between v(qt∗) and w(qt∗). Indeed,
if v(qt∗) exceeds w(qt∗) to a sufficient degree at all times t, then the decision maker
never transfers ownership of the firm until it becomes absolutely necessary (such as at
the death of the original owner). Such situations arise if the original owner is a much
more productive owner/manager of the firm than is the potential successor, at least
as evaluated by the relevant decision maker (who is commonly the original owner).
Current business conditions will influence the timing of asset transfers to the extent
that they affect the difference between v(qt∗) and w(qt∗). Stronger current business
conditions correspond to greater values of v(qt∗), which reduce the likelihood of asset
transfers except insofar as they are associated with even greater values of w(qt∗),
which are possible if new owners would benefit even more strongly from good current
(and presumably future) conditions. Firm size may also be associated with the differ-
ence between v(qt∗) and w(qt∗), as larger firms will commonly have organizational
structures that can better withstand the consequences of ownership changes.
The third through fifth terms on the right side of Eq. (2) capture the tax effects of
delaying ownership transfer. The third term is the product of the discount rate and the
tax cost of transfer, and reflects simply that delaying the incursion of a given tax liability
reduces its present value. The fourth term on the right side of Eq. (2) is the product
of the marginal tax rate and the change in the taxable value of a family firm. A rising
taxable value reduces the attractiveness of delaying a transfer, since with a positive
marginal tax rate it is clearly better to transfer ownership of a firm when it is valued at
e50 million than when it is valued at e100 million. Conversely, if a firm is declining
in value, then there is a tax benefit associated with delaying transfer. Notably, if the
taxable value of a firm rises at the discount rate, and tax obligations are scalar functions
of taxable transfers, then the third and fourth terms on the right side of Eq. (2) sum
to zero. Consequently, other considerations equal, taxable firm values that rise faster
than the discount rate are associated with accelerated transfers, whereas taxable values
that rise more slowly than the discount rate are associated with delayed transfers.
The fifth term on the right side of Eq. (2) is the change over time in the tax due
on the transfer of a firm of given taxable value. If tax rates are rising, then this term
reflects that it is costly to delay ownership transfers; and conversely, if tax rates are
falling, then it is beneficial to delay transfers.
Optimal ownership transfers incorporate all of these considerations. A local maxi-
mum at time t* is characterized by a positive value of dψdt∗ just prior to t*, a zero value
at t*, and a negative value immediately following t*. These properties reflect chang-
ing relative productivities of original owners and successors together with changing
degrees to which tax liabilities evolve over time. One of the tax considerations may
be that the decision maker anticipates that the taxable value of the firm will rise more
or less slowly than the discount rate.
4.2 Taxable andmarket values of family business property
Taxable values need not coincide exactly with actual values as understood by firm
owners. The tax authority obtains signals of firm value that are largely accurate but
may not incorporate recent information that has not yet been revealed in profitability or
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other objective measures. In order to capture the tax authority’s information acquisition
process, it is useful to consider a model in which the true value of a family firm at time
tˆ is given by:
qtˆ  ztˆθtˆ +
tˆ∫
0
ut dt, (3)
in which ztˆ is a vector of observable variables at time tˆ , θtˆ is a date-specific coefficient
vector, and ut is a time t innovation, the value of which is known to firm owners but not
necessarily to the tax authorities. ztˆ and θtˆ are assumed to be common knowledge. In
the formulation of Eq. (3), the true firm value is a function of observable considerations
captured in z and also a function of factors that are unknown to outsiders.
The signal of firm value available to the tax authority at time tˆ is stˆ , given by:
stˆ  ztˆθtˆ +
tˆ−γ
∫
0
ut dt +
tˆ∫
tˆ−γ
ut
(
tˆ − t
γ
)
dt . (4)
In this formulation stˆ differs from the true value qtˆ in that the calculation of stˆ
attaches linearly declining weight to more recent draws of ut , starting a period of
time γ prior to the present. This corresponds to the tax authority not having the same
information as taxpayers about recent developments that affect the firm value, with
the least weight attaching to the most recent developments.
In the model expressed by Eq. (4), and for unchanging values of z and θ , the tax
authority’s signal of firm value evolves according to:
dstˆ
dtˆ
 1
γ
tˆ∫
tˆ−γ
ut dt . (5)
Equation (5) implies that if recent draws of ut are positive, then st increases over
time, reflecting that the tax authority only gradually incorporates the most recent
information in its valuation of the firm. This most recent information, the cumulative
draws of ut between time tˆ − γ and time tˆ , might also be described as the current
business conditions of the firm. When current business conditions are favorable then
the tax authority will gradually revise upward its valuation of the firm, whereas when
current business conditions are unfavorable the tax authority will gradually revise
downward its valuation of the firm.
It is useful to consider the application of the model of firm valuation in Eqs. (3)–(5)
to optimal ownership transfer characterized in Eq. (2). If tax laws are unchanging
then ∂τ(st∗ ,t)
∂t∗  0 and the fifth term on the right side of (2) disappears. It follows
from (5) that if current business conditions are favorable, dstˆdtˆ > 0 which, given that
∂τ(st∗ ,t∗)
∂st∗ > 0, should encourage earlier transfers of ownership. It is worth bearing in
mind that dψdt∗  0 characterizes local optima, of which there may be more than one,
and that discrete changes in tax laws or business conditions may produce situations in
which there are discrete jumps in the value of ownership transfers.
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5 Data and descriptive statistics
5.1 Data
We conducted a survey on inheritances, inter vivos transfers, and transfer taxation
(the Inheritance and Gift Tax Survey–IGTS) among owners of family firms in Febru-
ary and March 2014. We first asked participants in the monthly Ifo business survey
whether they considered themselves to be family firms.9 The Ifo business survey is
conducted every month among 7000 German firms, and provides the basis for the
Ifo Business Climate Index, Germany’s leading business cycle indicator. 4660 firms
identified themselves as family firms. We then sent out the IGTS to the family firms.
The response rate was an encouraging 35.5%.10 Among other things, respondents pro-
vided information on years in which they made inter vivos transfers (exact amounts
of transfers are unknown, as are the identities of those who receive the inter vivos
transfers) and years in which they paid gift taxes.11 Understanding the determinants
of this measure of inter vivos transfer is the focus of this study.
The IGTS data on transfers of business ownership were matched to Ifo business
survey data. The Ifo business survey includes information on the current state of
business,12 the expected development of employment, and credit conditions. Survey
measures based on the self-assessment of managers may contain more information
than that embedded in financial statement data. While potentially somewhat subjective,
survey responses related to the current state of business may reflect not only current
turnover and profit figures (Abberger et al. 2009) but also new information, especially
when requested in the second half of the year when balance sheet information is
old (Hönig 2012). Similarly, self-reported firm credit conditions capture financial
restrictions more comprehensively than do standard measures such as leverage, credit
ratings, and liquidity. Since our sample includes firms that are not quoted on the stock
exchange, financial restrictions can be quite important (Hönig 2012). The business
survey data also include firm characteristics such as numbers of employees, broad
industry (construction, retail, manufacturing or services), the founding year, and the
legal form of each firm. In addition to the survey-based data, we use balance sheet
data such as total assets and total equity, based on the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk and
Hoppenstedt Firmeninformationen GmbH data bases.13 Business survey and balance
sheet data are preprocessed and provided by the Economics & Business Data Center
at the University of Munich and the Ifo Institute, Munich.14
The study uses annual data. In cases where monthly data are available, for instance
from the business survey, these data are converted to yearly frequency by computing
9 A firm is defined as a family firm if most voting capital is held by one or several interconnected families.
10 See Seiler (2010) on nonresponse in business surveys.
11 The survey questions are “Have there been inter vivos transfers of assets in your firm since the year
2000? Yes, in the year…/no,” and “Have you paid the gift tax since the year 2000? Yes, in the year …/no”.
12 The survey statement is “We evaluate our present state of business as good/satisfactory/bad.” The sim-
plicity of this survey question makes it easily understood by potential respondents, and contributes to the
high response rate. Complete questionnaires are available at https://doi.org/10.7805/ebdc-bep-2012.
13 See Hoenig (2009, 2010) on how survey and balance sheet data are linked.
14 See Seiler (2012) for more information.
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yearly averages. Balance sheet data are not available for all firms, and not for the year
2013. The regressions reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5 omit observations for which rele-
vant data are missing, as a result of which the sample sizes can decrease significantly
when including balance sheet control variables in some regressions.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the subsamples of firms that did not, and those
that did, make inter vivos transfers. The total sample includes 13,706 observations of
1654 firms. Three hundred and sixteen firms reported one or more inter vivos transfers
(358 inter vivos transfers in total) since 2000. The share of firms making inter vivos
transfers is thus quite small.15 Since business assets are an illiquid form of wealth,
the small share of observed inter vivos transfers in our sample is reasonable (Poterba
2001). One variable in Table 1 is reported in categorical form: firm employment,
which is measured as an integer from 0 to 5, with 0 corresponding to 0–19 employ-
ees, 1 corresponding to 20–49 employees, 2 corresponding to 50–249 employees, 3
corresponding to 250–999 employees, 4 corresponding to 1000–4999 employees, and
5 corresponding to 5000 or more employees. Table 2 shows pairwise correlations of
the variables.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 describe the distribution of inter vivos transfers among firms in or
with different industries, legal forms, and numbers of employees. The sample includes
firms in the construction (45 inter vivos transfers), retail (88 transfers), manufacturing
(184 transfers) and services industries (41 transfers). The rhombi in Fig. 1 show that
relative to the whole sample, inter vivos transfers are more likely to occur in the
manufacturing, construction, and retail industries than in services. Figure 2 shows that
inter vivos transfers mostly occurred in firms operating as partnerships (46 transfers)
or corporations (44 transfers), but rarely in proprietorships (one transfer).16 Figure 3
shows that most inter vivos transfers in the sample (126 transfers) are made by firms
with between 50 and 249 employees. The rhombi indicate that the likelihood of making
inter vivos transfers increases with numbers of employees. While inter vivos transfers
occur in only 1.46% of firm-year observations of firms with fewer than 19 employees,
they do so in 8% of the cases of firms with more than 5000 employees.
Figure 4 shows the average current state of business of firm-year observations
with and without inter vivos transfers. The dashed line describes the average current
state of business of firms making contemporaneous inter vivos transfers (left scale).
The solid line describes the average current state of business of firms not making
contemporaneous inter vivos transfers (left scale). The bars in the background display
numbers of inter vivos transfers made each year (right scale). Annual numbers of
inter vivos transfers rise over the sample period. Figure 4 indicates that firms making
inter vivos transfers in most years had better current business conditions than firms
not making inter vivos transfers. The years 2000–2001, 2003, and 2005–2006 are
15 Given asymmetries in reporting, it is likely that even fewer transfers would have been recorded if the
survey instead asked beneficiaries about receipts of transferred business assets (Gale and Scholz 1994).
16 Data on legal forms and numbers of employees are not available for the entire sample; consequently,
Figs. 1, 2, and 3 are each based on different samples.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Source
No inter vivos transfers
Inter vivos
transfers
13,348 0.00 0.00 0 0 See below
Current state of
business
13,348 2.01 0.57 1 3
Construction 13,348 0.13 0.33 0 1
Retail 13,348 0.26 0.44 0 1
Manufacturing 13,348 0.37 0.48 0 1
Services industries 13,348 0.24 0.43 0 1
Expected
development of
employment
13,341 1.95 0.34 1 3
Number of
employees (cat.)
10,337 1.33 1.07 0 5
Credit conditions 8259 0.31 0.46 0 1
Proprietorship 4301 0.08 0.27 0 1
Partnership 4301 0.36 0.48 0 1
Corporation 4301 0.56 0.50 0 1
Firm age (years) 3792 40.01 45.59 0 882
Total assets (log) 3025 14.86 1.87 7 21
Total equity (log) 2797 13.57 2.10 6 21
Inter vivos transfers
Inter vivos
transfers
358 1.00 0.00 1 1
Current state of
business
358 2.13 0.56 1 3
Construction 358 0.13 0.33 0 1
Retail 358 0.25 0.43 0 1
Manufacturing 358 0.51 0.50 0 1
Services industries 358 0.11 0.32 0 1
Expected
development of
employment
358 2.00 0.34 1 3
Number of
employees (cat.)
324 1.77 1.07 0 5
Credit conditions 278 0.17 0.38 0 1
Proprietorship 91 0.01 0.10 0 1
Partnership 91 0.51 0.50 0 1
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Table 1 continued
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Source
Corporation 91 0.48 0.50 0 1
Firm age (years) 87 56.74 98.87 0 880
Total assets (log) 68 15.75 2.12 8 21
Total equity (log) 67 14.36 2.56 8 21
Inter vivos transfer
with transfer tax
payment
358 0.13 0.34 0 1
Total sample
Inter vivos
transfers
13,706 0.03 0.16 0 1 Own collection
(Inheritance and
Gift Tax Survey)
Current state of
business
13,706 2.01 0.57 1 3 Ifo business
survey
Construction 13,706 0.13 0.33 0 1 Ifo business
survey
Retail 13,706 0.26 0.44 0 1 Ifo business
survey
Manufacturing 13,706 0.38 0.48 0 1 Ifo business
survey
Services industries 13,706 0.24 0.42 0 1 Ifo business
survey
Expected
development of
employment
13,699 1.95 0.34 1 3 Ifo business
survey
Number of
employees (cat.)
10,661 1.35 1.07 0 5 Ifo business
survey
Credit conditions 8537 0.30 0.46 0 1 Ifo business
survey
Proprietorship 4392 0.08 0.27 0 1 Amadeus/
Hoppenstedt
Partnership 4392 0.36 0.48 0 1 Amadeus/
Hoppenstedt
Corporation 4392 0.56 0.50 0 1 Amadeus/
Hoppenstedt
Firm age (years) 3879 40.38 47.48 0 882 Amadeus/
Hoppenstedt
Total assets (log) 3093 14.88 1.88 7 21 Amadeus/
Hoppenstedt
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Table 1 continued
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Source
Total equity (log) 2864 13.58 2.12 6 21 Amadeus/
Hoppenstedt
Inter vivos transfer
with transfer tax
payment
13,706 0.01 0.06 0 1 Own collection
(Inheritance and
Gift Tax Survey)
The top panel of the table presents descriptive statistics for firm-year observations in which there are no
inter vivos transfers; the middle panel presents descriptive statistics for firm-year observations in which
there are positive inter vivos transfers; and the bottom panel presents descriptive statistics for all firm-year
observations. The variable “Inter vivos transfers” takes the value one if there is an inter vivos transfer,
and zero otherwise. “Current state of business” takes the value 1 for firms that describe their business
conditions as “bad,” takes the value 2 for firms that describe their business conditions as “satisfactory,”
and takes the value 3 for firms that describe their business conditions as “good” (monthly survey responses
are converted to yearly averages). “Construction,” “Retail,” “Manufacturing,” and “Services Industries” are
dummy variables that take the value one if a firm is active in the respective industry and zero otherwise.
“Expected development of employment” takes the value 1 for firms that expect the number of employees
to “decrease,” takes the value 2 for firms that expect the number of employees to “not change,” and takes
the value 3 for firms that expect the number of employees to “increase” (monthly survey responses are
converted to yearly averages). “Number of employees” takes the value 0 for firms with 0–19 employees, 1
for firms with 20–49 employees, 2 for firms with 50–249 employees, 3 for firms with 250–999 employees,
4 for firms with 1000–4999 employees, and 5 for firms with 5000 or more employees. “Credit conditions”
takes the value 1 for firms that describe their credit status as “financially constrained,” and zero otherwise.
“Propietorship,” “Partnership,” and “Corporation” are dummy variables that take the value one if a firm
has the respective legal form, and zero otherwise. “Firm age” is measured in years. “Total assets (log)” is
the natural logarithm of total firm assets. “Total equity (log)” is the natural logarithm of outstanding firm
equity value. “Inter vivos transfers with transfer tax payment” takes the value one if there is an inter vivos
transfer with accompanying gift tax payment, and zero otherwise
exceptions, though the mean current state of business of firms with inter vivos transfers
is based on only 4 to 13 observations in each of those years, reflecting that information
on the current state of business is available for less than half of the reported inter
vivos transfers in years prior to 2006, and making any inference potentially subject
to the influence of outliers. The figure also suggests that the current state of business
and number of inter vivos transfers are positively correlated. For example, when the
financial and economic crisis hit in 2009 and business conditions deteriorated, firms
made fewer inter vivos transfers than in preceding or subsequent years.
Most reported transfers took place since 2010. It is impossible to rule out recall
bias, in which survey respondents are less apt to remember inter vivos transfers made
years earlier—though these ownership transfers are so important to owners of family
firms that it is difficult to imagine that they could possibly forget even the details of
transfers during the preceding 15 years. In a similar vein, some family firms in the
sample might not have been in existence at the start of the observation period. Another
source of potential bias is sample selection, because, by construction, the sample
includes only firms that still operated in 2014. Unsuccessful family firms disappeared
from the market and cannot be included.
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Fig. 1 Industry and inter vivos transfers. Note The shaded bars depict numbers of firm-year inter vivos
transfers (left scale) by industry, whereas the rhombi denote ratios (right scale) of these transfers to total
firm-year observations in each industry
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Fig. 2 Legal form and inter vivos transfers. Note The shaded bars depict numbers of firm-year inter vivos
transfers (left scale) by legal form of business, whereas the rhombi denote ratios (right scale) of these
transfers to total firm-year observations of firms with each legal form
6 Empirical analysis
6.1 Empirical strategy
The theory sketched in Sect. 4 implies the following baseline empirical model of the
ownership transfer decision:
Tit  β1cit + β2xit + εi t , (6)
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in which Tit takes the value one if firm i reports an inter vivos transfer in year t, and is
zero otherwise. The variable cit in Eq. (6) is the yearly average of firm i’s perception
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of the current business condition, measured on a scale between one (bad) and three
(good). The variable xit is a vector of firm i and year t characteristics, and β1 a scalar
and β2 a vector of coefficients to be estimated. Control variables include firm sizes as
measured by numbers of employees, and a dummy variable for years before the 2009
reform of inheritance and gift taxation. It is reasonable to expect inter vivos transfers
to occur more frequently among larger firms with better current business conditions,
and in years when the tax regime favors inter vivos transfers relative to inheritances.
Additional control variables are intended to capture organizational features that might
influence the cost and return to transferring firm ownership; these include firm assets,
firm equity, firm age, dummy variables for a firm’s legal form of organization, a
firm’s self-reported credit status, and its expected future development of employment.
Anticipation of future tax changes can also affect the timing of ownership transfers and
may be partly reflected in firms’ assessments of current and future business conditions
that are included as explanatory variables. Equation (6) is estimated as a random-effects
logit model with classical standard errors.
6.2 Results
Table 3 presents results of estimating Eq. (6), displaying not the estimated coefficients
but instead the corresponding odds ratios, for which an odds ratio of 1.0 implies that the
associated variable has no effect on the dependent variable, and the P values reported
in Table 3 correspond to tests of the hypotheses that the odds ratios equal unity. The
regression reported in the first column includes the current business condition as an
explanatory variable; the associated 1.439 odds ratio implies that improving business
conditions from “bad” to “normal” or “normal” to “good” increases the odds (relative
likelihood) of an inter vivos transfer by 43.9 percent. The odds ratio is statistically
significant at the 1% level. The regressions reported in columns (2) to (4) include
industry fixed effects, and sequentially add a dummy variable for the period before
2009, and numbers of employees (measured in six categories). The 1.456 odds ratio
in column (4) implies that when the current business condition increases by one point
(from bad to normal or normal to good), the relative likelihood of making an inter
vivos transfer increases by 45.6 percent. The 0.499 odds ratio of the dummy variable
for the period before 2009 in column (4) is smaller than one and statistically significant
at the 1% level, indicating that, conditional on other variables, firms were less likely
to make inter vivos transfers before the inheritance and gift tax reform in 2009 than
after the reform. The odds ratio of the current business condition remains statistically
significant at the 1% level. The odds ratio of the number of employees is larger than
one and statistically significant at the 1% level in column (4).
Table 4 presents regressions with additional independent variables. The regressions
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 add control variables for the firm’s expected
development of employment and credit conditions. The odds ratio of the credit con-
ditions variable is statistically significant at the 1% level, its magnitude implying
that when credit conditions are difficult, the chance of making an inter vivos transfer
decreases. The regressions in columns (3) to (5) control for other firm characteristics:
firm age (in years), a firm’s legal form of organization, total assets (in logs, column
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4), and total equity (in logs, column 5). The odds ratio of firm age (a variable hav-
ing a maximum value of 882 years) is statistically significant at the 5% level only
in the regression reported in column (3). The odds ratio of total assets is statistically
significant at the 1% level, and similarly, the odds ratio of total equity is statistically
significant at the 5% level; together they indicate that inter vivos transfers are more
common among larger and more valuable firms.17 Including these firm size and value
variables somewhat diminishes the statistical significance of the effect of the current
business condition, reflecting the collinearity of these variables as well as smaller
sample sizes. As noted in Sect. 4.2, good current business conditions affect expected
future firm value but may not be yet captured in current taxable value. Because firm
characteristics are not available for the full sample, the number of observations in
columns (3) to (5) of Table 4 (including firm age and size) is much smaller than the
number of observations in the regressions in Table 3. The regression reported in col-
umn (6) includes a linear and quadratic time trend to control for whether firms made
inter vivos transfers more frequently in recent years. The estimated odds ratio of the
squared trend is statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that transfers have
been more frequent recently; inclusion of time trend variables does not change the
estimated positive effects of firm size and the current state of business.
The regression results indicate that better current business conditions are associ-
ated with greater likelihoods of inter vivos transfers. The association persists when
controlling for the 2009 tax reform, industry, firm size, and firm value. This pattern is
consistent with firm owners having inside knowledge about a firm’s current business
condition that is not yet fully captured in taxable value for transfer tax purposes. As a
result, when the current business condition is good, a firm’s valuation for transfer tax
purposes is likely to increase in the future, creating an incentive to accelerate asset
transfers. In addition, when a firm’s business condition is good, the firm owner per-
ceives the firm to be more successful in the future than when the business condition is
bad, and possibly less needy of the value provided by maintaining original ownership.
Anticipating the need at some point to pass on a successful firm to the next generation is
likely to influence tax planning and encourage immediate transfers of business assets.
One of the challenges of interpreting the evidence is that there are non-tax reasons
why stronger current business conditions might be associated with ownership transfers.
It is possible to examine more closely the tax interpretation by distinguishing very
small (0–19 employee) from larger (20 + employee) firms before and after the 2009 tax
change. Transfers of ownership of firms with fewer than 20 employees were exempt
from tax after 2009, thereby eliminating any effect of current business conditions
on the tax consequences of ownership transfers. By contrast, the 2009 tax change
introduced a tax exemption for firms with 20 or more employees that sufficiently
maintain employment levels in the years after ownership transfers.
Figure 5 depicts differences between the likelihoods of ownership transfers of firms
with “good” business conditions and those with “bad” or “normal” business condi-
tions. The leftmost bars reflect that the difference between the likelihood of ownership
17 These specifications, and indeed the available data, do not distinguish between wealth effects (Poterba
2001; Hrung 2004; Villanueva 2005) and ownership effects (more valuable firms have more owners and
therefore more potential donors).
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Fig. 5 Differential effect of “good” business conditions on inter vivos transfers before and after the 2009 tax
reform. Note Fig. 5 shows differences between the likelihoods of ownership transfers of firms with “good”
business conditions (mean plus one standard deviation and larger) and those with “bad” or “normal” business
conditions for small (0–19 employee) and large (20 + employees) firms before and after the 2009 tax reform
transfers by a small (0–19 employee) firm with “good” business conditions, and one
with “bad” or “normal” conditions, was 2.47 percent prior to the 2009 tax change and
1.27 percent afterward. The two rightmost bars indicate that the difference between
the likelihood of ownership transfers by a large (20 + employee) firm with “good”
business conditions, and one with “bad” or “normal” conditions, was 0.31 percent
prior to the 2009 tax change and 0.70 percent afterward. Consequently, it appears that
the effect of business conditions on the likelihood of ownership transfers declined for
small firms after 2009 while it rose for large firms, which is consistent with their tax
incentives. Due to the relatively small numbers of ownership transfers among small
firms the pattern depicted in Fig. 5 is not statistically significant, so it is not possible
to rule out effects of non-tax considerations or even that small and large firms reacted
similarly to the 2009 tax change.
6.3 Robustness tests
Tables 5 and 6 present results of additional regression specifications intended to explore
the robustness of the results appearing in Table 3.
Unobserved firm-specific characteristics (such as the presence of a qualified suc-
cessor or the age of the owner) may be correlated with the regressors. It is possible to
control for unobserved firm-specific characteristics by estimating fixed effects models
that exploit only the within variation of the explanatory variables, though doing so has
the downside of effectively disregarding the information contained in cross-sectional
variation. Fixed effects estimation of nonlinear panel data is possible for the logit
model, but not for the probit model. Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of a
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fixed effects logit model, which are consistent with inferences based on the results
reported in Table 3. Among firms making at least one inter vivos transfer during the
observation period, the odds (relative likelihood) of making inter vivos transfers are
46.1 percent larger when the current state of business is good than when the current
state of business is normal.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 present the results of estimating random-effects pro-
bit and OLS models, instead of the baseline random-effects logit model. The results
remain qualitatively unchanged. Columns (4) and (5) display the results of logit esti-
mation of the determinants of inter vivos transfers before and after the 2009 reform;
in both time periods the likelihood of asset transfer is positively associated with the
current state of business. The regression reported in column (1) of Table 6 restricts the
sample to firms making at most one inter vivos transfer over the observation period,
with results that closely resemble those for the whole sample reported in column (4) of
Table 3. The regression reported in column (2) of Table 6 uses data only for firms not
older than 250 years, thereby dropping seven of the observations used in the regression
reported in column (3) of Table 4. The results are almost identical, with the current
state of business continuing to be associated with asset transfers, though the odds ratio
of firm age is not statistically significant.
Ownership changes have the potential to affect business conditions, which intro-
duces the possibility of joint determination of these two variables. The regression
reported in column (3) of Table 6 addresses the potential reverse causality of the cur-
rent state of business variable by using its first lag rather than the contemporaneous
value. The estimated odds ratio diminishes in magnitude but remains statistically sig-
nificant. The regression reported in column (4) drops this lagged variable and instead
uses the first lead, as a result of which the estimated odds ratio becomes statistically
insignificant. Another possibility is that the change in business conditions, rather than
the level, might influence ownership transfers, if the change is a better predictor of ris-
ing future asset values. The evidence, however, indicates otherwise: one-year changes
in business conditions have insignificant effects on asset transfers when used in place
of current business conditions in the specifications of Tables 3 and 4.
The positive association between the current state of business and the likelihood
of inter vivos transfers may depend on whether firm owners transfer assets in excess
of exempt amounts. The regression reported in column (5) of Table 6 replaces the
dependent variable by a variable that assumes the value one when firms report an inter
vivos transfer in a given year and a transfer tax payment in the same year or during the
following three years, and zero otherwise.18 This specification produces an estimated
odds ratio of the current state of business quite similar to the baseline model, one that
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus the data suggest that the effect
of the current state of business on the likelihood of taxed inter vivos transfers lies only
at the margin of statistical significance. Several other specification checks produce
18 13 percent of inter vivos transfers were accompanied by a tax payment in the same year or during the
following three years (see Table 1).
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results consistent with inferences drawn from the evidence presented in Tables 3, 4,
5, and 6, and Appendix considers issues with selective responses to the survey.19
6.4 Implications
The evidence in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 indicates that current business conditions are
strongly associated with ownership transfers, a baseline specification indicating that
the odds of making transfers increase by 46 percent when current business conditions
are “good” rather than “normal.” While many business and family considerations
may contribute to this pattern, there is reason to expect it at least partly to reflect
reactions to tax incentives, and the empirical patterns are broadly consistent with this
interpretation. To the extent that the 46 percent effect consists of reactions to tax
incentives, it follows that firm owners are highly purposeful and quickly reactive in
their asset transfer decisions, and that tax authorities by contrast are rather slow to
adjust their valuations of family business assets.
7 Conclusion
Policymakers are understandably concerned about the potential effect of transfer taxes
on the liquidity of family firms and the resulting viability of ongoing business oper-
ations. One way to address liquidity issues is to encourage inter vivos giving, so that
firms choose when to transfer ownership rather than relying on mortality. The results
in this paper indicate that ownership succession is more likely when market condi-
tions are good, which is consistent with tax avoidance and with a desire to transfer
ownership of better-performing assets.
These patterns suggest that, for a given firm value, intergenerational transfer tax-
ation imposes greater burdens on underperforming firms than on firms that perform
well. Well-performing firms are more likely to make inter vivos transfers of business
assets, which are generally tax favored and can be timed to maximize tax advantage.
If an underperforming firm does not manage to prepare for succession in advance,
the inheritance tax burden at the moment of the owner’s death will be larger than the
tax burden of an otherwise-similar well-performing firm, the assets of which were
transferred during lifetime. The desirability of distinguishing tax burdens in this way
may depend on the impact of transfer taxes on the activities of well-performing and
poorly performing firms, about which currently very little is known.
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Appendix
Because the study relies on survey data, response behavior may raise sample selection
issues. Firms making inter vivos transfers could be overrepresented in the sample
since the topic of the questionnaire is inheritance, inter vivos gifts, and their taxation.
Firms unfamiliar with the inheritance and gift tax law because they did not experience a
succession or did not make inter vivos transfers may have been less likely to participate
because they did not think they had anything to contribute to the survey. Appendix
Table 7 compares family firms responding to the IGTS to firms not responding. T tests
Table 7 Survey response behavior
Non-response Response Test statistic
(difference)
Current state of business 2.10 2.07 0.03*
(0.042)
N 3003 1657
Expected development
of employment
2.00 1.98 0.02**
(0.009)
N 3003 1657
Credit conditions 0.26 0.27 −0.01
(0.347)
N 2180 1224
Firm age 40.16 38.09 2.07
(0.187)
N 1983 1113
Total assets (log) 14.87 14.58 0.29***
(0.000)
N 1812 1020
Total equity (log) 13.41 13.12 0.29***
(0.001)
N 1733 975
The table presents numbers and mean values of responses to questions about firm characteristics, distin-
guishing respondents by whether or not they participated in the Inheritance and Gift Tax Survey (IGTS).
Observations in the “Non-response” column represent firms not participating in the IGTS; observations
in the “Response” column represent firms that did participate in the IGTS. Rows denoted “N” indicate
numbers of firm-year observations of firms providing the specified information. Test statistics and P values
correspond to standard t tests of differences between respondents and non-respondents in mean values of
firm characteristics
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Chi-squared 92.14
Prob > Chi-squared 0.0000***
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Fig. 6 Response rates and firm characteristics. Note The figure presents distributions of IGTS survey respon-
dents and non-respondents by size (numbers of employees), federal state within Germany, industry, and
legal form of operation. The figures display results of a Pearson Chi-squared test that response behavior is
independent of numbers of employees/federal state/industry/legal form
reported in Appendix Table 7 indicate that the means of credit conditions and firm age
are not statistically different in the two subsamples. Firms responding to the survey had
a somewhat worse current state of business and expected development of employment
than firms not responding (2.07 and 2.10; 1.98 and 2.00). Firms responding to the
survey tend to be somewhat smaller than non-response firms as measured by log total
assets and log total equity (14.58 and 14.87; 13.12 and 13.41). A Chi-squared test
does not reject the null hypothesis that response behavior is independent of the federal
state within Germany (P value of 0.51, see Fig. 5), but Chi-squared tests indicate
that response behavior varies with numbers of employees, industry, and legal form.
Firms responding to the survey tend to have fewer employees than firms choosing not to
respond.20 The results of the Chi-squared tests and t tests notwithstanding, there is little
evidence that sample selection is an important issue in interpreting the results, since
differences between the subsamples are small and the categorical variables assume
multiple values in both of the subsamples. Furthermore, there is little reason to expect
self-classification as a family firm in the Ifo Business Climate Survey to be prone to
sample selection, since firms answered this question prior to learning the topic of the
IGTS.
See Fig. 6.
20 Firm size is correlated with industry and legal form: firms in the retail and the services industries have, on
average, fewer employees than firms in the construction and manufacturing industries, and firms operating
as proprietorships have, on average, fewer employees than firms operating as corporations or partnerships.
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